The scoping exercise is seen as a starting point and is expected to touch on an extensive range of issues, including the human element, safety, security, interactions with ports, pilotage, responses to incidents and protection of the marine environment. Delegations suggested the exercise should include scoping of the full range of human element factors within different levels of autonomy for both shipboard and shore-based personnel; scoping of the reliability, robustness, resiliency and redundancy of the underlying technical, communications, software and engineering systems; and consideration of conducting a Formal Safety Assessment or gap analysis as to the safety, technical, human element and operational aspects of autonomous remotely controlled or unmanned ships. It is anticipated that the work would take place over four MSC sessions, through to mid Submissions were invited to the next session MSC 99, May The review has taken into account recommendations arising from the investigation into the Costa Concordia incident.
|Published (Last):||2 September 2011|
|PDF File Size:||2.60 Mb|
|ePub File Size:||8.70 Mb|
|Price:||Free* [*Free Regsitration Required]|
Many existing units have operated successfully and safely for extended periods of time and their operating history should be considered in evaluating their suitability to conduct dynamically positioned operations. The purpose of a FSVAD is to ensure that the vessel is operated, surveyed and tested according to vessel specific procedures and that the results are properly recorded. Application The Guidelines apply to dynamically positioned units or vessels, the keel of which is laid or which is at a similar stage of construction on or after 1 July The power system includes:.
The thruster system includes:. The DP-control system consists of 1. Redundancy can be achieved for instance by installation of multiple components, systems or alternative means of performing a function. See Appendix for model form. Any such vessels should, however, comply with safety requirements which, in the opinion of the Administration, are adequate for the service intended and are such as to ensure the overall safety of the vessel. The Administration which allows any such exemptions should list the exemptions on the Flag State Verification and Acceptance Document FSVAD and communicate to the Organization the particulars, together with the reason therefor, so that the Organization may circulate the same to other Governments for the information of their officers.
The necessary reliability is determined by the consequence of a loss of position keeping capability. The larger the consequence, the more reliable the DP-system should be. To achieve this philosophy the requirements have been grouped into three equipment classes.
For each equipment class the associated worst case failure should be defined as in 2. The equipment class of the vessel required for a particular operation should be agreed between the owner of the vessel and the customer based on a risk analysis of the consequence of a loss of position. Else, the Administration or coastal State may decide the equipment class for the particular operation.
Normally static components will not be considered to fail where adequate protection from damage is demonstrated, and reliability is to the satisfaction of the Administration. Single failure criteria include:. For equipment class 3, a single failure includes:. Non-redundant connections between otherwise redundant and separated systems may be accepted provided that it is documented to give clear safety advantages, and that their reliability can be demonstrated and documented to the satisfaction of the Administration.
Such connections should be kept to the absolute minimum and made to fail to the safest condition. Failure in one system should in no case be transferred to the other redundant system. The transfer to redundant component or system should be automatic as far as possible, and operator intervention should be kept to a minimum. The transfer should be smooth and within acceptable limitations of the operation.
The power system may be run as one system during operation, but should be arranged by bus-tie breakers to separate automatically upon failures which could be transferred from one system to another, including overloading and short-circuits.
The divided power system should be located in different spaces separated by A. Where the power systems are located below the operational waterline, the separation should also be watertight. Bus-tie breakers should be open during equipment class 3 operations unless equivalent integrity of power operation can be accepted according to 3.
Information necessary to operate the DP-system safely should be visible at all times. Other information should be available upon operator request. The DP-control system should provide for easy selection of control mode, i. A permanent record of their occurrence and of status changes should be provided together with any necessary explanations. The redundant components should be so arranged that a failure of one component should be isolated, and the other component activated.
In addition, one back-up DP-control system should be arranged, see 3. An alarm should be initiated if any computer fails or is not ready to take control. This analysis should verify that the thrusters remaining in operation after the worst case failure can generate the same resultant thruster force and moment as required before the failure. The consequence analysis should provide an alarm if the occurrence of a worst case failure would lead to a loss of position due to insufficient thrust for the prevailing environmental conditions.
For operations which will take a long time to safely terminate, the consequence analysis should include a function which simulates the thrust and power remaining after the worse case failure, based on manual input of weather trend. The automatic transfer of control from one computer system to another should be smooth, and within the acceptable limitations of the operation. During DP-operation this back-up control system should be continuously updated by input from the sensors, position reference system, thruster feedback, etc.
The switch-over of control to the back-up system should be manual, situated on the back-up computer and should not be affected by failure of the main DP-control system. UPS battery capacity should provide a minimum of 30 minutes operation following a mains supply failure.
Where this is unavoidable such cables could run together in cable ducts of A class, the termination of the ducts included, which are effectively protected from all fire hazards, except that represented by the cables themselves. Cable connection boxes are not allowed in such ducts.
Where this in unavoidable, such pipes could run together in ducts of A class, the termination of the ducts included, which are effectively protected from all fire hazards, except that represented by the pipes themselves. In this context deterioration of environmental conditions and the necessary time to safely terminate the operation should also be taken into consideration.
This should be checked by way of environmental envelopes if operating in equipment class 1 and by way of an automatic consequence analysis if operating in equipment class 2 or 3. The necessary operating instructions, etc. Further it includes a complete test of all systems and components and the ability to keep position after single failures associated with the assigned equipment class.
A complete test should be carried out as required in 5. The annual survey should ensure that the DP-system has been maintained in accordance with applicable parts of the guidelines and is in good working order. Further an annual test of all important systems and components should be carried out to document the ability of the DP-vessel to keep position after single failures associated with the assigned equipment class.
After such a survey, necessary tests should be carried out to demonstrate full compliance with the applicable provisions of the Guidelines. The type of tests carried out and results should be recorded and kept on board. The Administration may, however, entrust the surveys and testing either to surveyors nominated for the purpose or to organizations recognized by it. In every case the Administration concerned should fully guarantee the completeness and efficiency of the surveys and testing.
The Administration may entrust the owner of the vessel to carry out annual and minor repair surveys according to a test programme accepted by the Administration.
If the language used is neither English nor French, the text should include a translation into one of these languages. The vessel is allowed to operate in DP Equipment Class and in lower equipment classes. This document remains valid until unless terminated by the Administration, provided that the vessel is operated, tested, and surveyed according to the requirements in the guidelines and the results are properly recorded. As an alternative reference can be made to drawings, etc.
It is important that it is possible by this list to identify all systems and components covered by FSVAD. Software versions should also be identified. Equipment installed after date of issuing FSVAD should only be included in the list after control and testing has been completed and modifications and non-conformities report signed.
Maritime Safety Committee (MSC), 98th session, 7-16 June 2017
You are on page 1of 17 Search inside document 7 uscveire. Soeeeeneeeee see 3 Functional requirements Genera a 7 Power system The Guidelines are not intended to prohibit the use of eny existing vessel because its dynanic positioning system does aot comply with these Guidelines. Mony existing units have operated successfully and safely for extended periods of tine and their operating history should be considered in evelusting their suitability to conduct dynamically positioned operations.
Guidelines for vessels and units with dynamic positioning (DP) systems (MSC.1/Circ. 1580)
Guidelines for vessels with dynamic positioning systems (MSC Circular 645)
IMO MSC Circ 645 DP Systems